# Purchase and Base payment nonces

The commitment in [near-settlement.md §5](/spec/near-settlement) is the only payment model.
`Purchase.nonce` is 32 cryptographically random bytes generated locally. It is part of the
Borsh purchase commitment, along with the file, terms, buyer key, refund and recovery identities,
route, asset, price, expiry, contract and network.

```
purchase_id = SHA256("annon/purchase/v2" ‖ 0x00 ‖ Borsh(Purchase))
base_nonce = keccak256("annon/base-payment/v2" ‖ 0x00 ‖ purchase_id)
```

`purchase_id` is decoded to 32 bytes before hashing. On Base the commitment network is exactly
`eip155:8453` and asset is `0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913` (lowercase Base USDC).
NEAR network names are refused on Base. The buyer signs EIP-3009 TransferWithAuthorization with
`nonce = base_nonce`, `to = terms.base.pay_to`, and `value = terms.base.price`. The canonical §5.1 purchase MESSAGE string travels in `extensions.annon.info.purchase` and in
`unlock({args:{purchase: message, logs, header}})`; neither carries a decoded Purchase object.

The SDK signs `validBefore <= expires_at`; the seller requires that bound. The Base contract
path does not check `expires_at`. USDC enforces `validBefore` on settlement, so a later unlock
has no independent expiry. A block header is required only after sales stop. It must match the
payment's Base block; block time `<= sales_stopped_at + 300` seconds still unlocks, even if the
proof arrives much later (`STOP_SETTLEMENT_SECONDS = 300`, inclusive). While sales are open,
`header` may be null. Takedown still blocks releases.

The old concatenation of contract/file/key is not produced or accepted. A random EIP-3009 nonce
cannot release a key; the seller verifies the commitment before giving a payload to a facilitator.
Vectors: `vectors/nonce.json` and `vectors/near-settlement.json`.
