Purchase and Base payment nonces
The commitment in near-settlement.md §5 is the only payment model.
Purchase.nonce is 32 cryptographically random bytes generated locally. It is part of the
Borsh purchase commitment, along with the file, terms, buyer key, refund and recovery identities,
route, asset, price, expiry, contract and network.
purchase_id = SHA256("annon/purchase/v2" ‖ 0x00 ‖ Borsh(Purchase))
base_nonce = keccak256("annon/base-payment/v2" ‖ 0x00 ‖ purchase_id)
purchase_id is decoded to 32 bytes before hashing. On Base the commitment network is exactly
eip155:8453 and asset is 0x833589fcd6edb6e08f4c7c32d4f71b54bda02913 (lowercase Base USDC).
NEAR network names are refused on Base. The buyer signs EIP-3009 TransferWithAuthorization with
nonce = base_nonce, to = terms.base.pay_to, and value = terms.base.price. The canonical §5.1 purchase MESSAGE string travels in extensions.annon.info.purchase and in
unlock({args:{purchase: message, logs, header}}); neither carries a decoded Purchase object.
The SDK signs validBefore <= expires_at; the seller requires that bound. The Base contract
path does not check expires_at. USDC enforces validBefore on settlement, so a later unlock
has no independent expiry. A block header is required only after sales stop. It must match the
payment's Base block; block time <= sales_stopped_at + 300 seconds still unlocks, even if the
proof arrives much later (STOP_SETTLEMENT_SECONDS = 300, inclusive). While sales are open,
header may be null. Takedown still blocks releases.
The old concatenation of contract/file/key is not produced or accepted. A random EIP-3009 nonce
cannot release a key; the seller verifies the commitment before giving a payload to a facilitator.
Vectors: vectors/nonce.json and vectors/near-settlement.json.